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Interwar Poland is hardly mentioned in current American textbooks 
on the history of twentieth-century Europe, and even then the information is 
generally sparse and often misleading. Poland makes an appearance with the 
Versailles Treaty of 1919, generally considered a bad treaty whose German-
Polish settlement is sometimes judged as contrary to the principle of self-
determination. Polish armed resistance against the Germans in September 
1939 generally goes unmentioned and the Soviet attack on Poland is often 
explained as dictated by Soviet security. There is usually very little mention 
of Polish foreign policy, yet it should be studied as a factor in international 
politics in the interwar period, especially in the years from Hitler‘s rise to 
power in Germany to his attack on Poland, sparking the outbreak of WW II. 
The pre-Hitler period is often passed over lightly although it contains the 
roots of Western attitudes toward Nazi Germany. In fact, before adopting the 
policy of appeasement toward Hitler, Britain, whose decisions ultimately 
determined French policy, assumed that German demands for the revision of 
the Versailles Treaty of 1919, particularly the German-Polish settlement, 
must be satisfied to secure lasting peace. One should bear in mind that 
despite her defeat in November 1918, Germany was still the greatest 
industrial power in Europe; France feared Germany but needed her coal and 
steel, while Britain needed the German market for her goods. Britain also 
needed peace in Europe to devote her limited armed forces to the defense of 
her overseas Empire. Finally, Eastern Europe was not seen as a sphere of 
vital British interests. All these factors contributed to the belief of all British 
governments that the Polish-German frontier — not recognized by Germany 
— should be revised in her favor. This meant, above all, the return to 
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Germany of the preponderantly German port city of Danzig — made a self-
governing Free City by the Treaty of Versailles — and also the 
preponderantly Polish-speaking Polish Pomerania, awarded by the treaty to 
Poland. The Germans called it the Polish Corridor because this narrow neck 
of land separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. French 
governments came to accept the British view and saw the Franco-Polish 
alliance (1921) as less an advantage than a burden. Few people realized at 
the time that all German statesmen before Hitler aimed at the return not just 
of Danzig and the Polish Corridor but also most, and if possible all the 
territory of Prussian Poland as well as eastern Upper Silesia, even though the 
vast majority of the inhabitants of these territories were Polish. 
 At the same time, Poland was often criticized for taking too much 
former Russian territory after its victory over the Red Army in 1920, a view 
shared by the Soviet leadership with émigré Russian politicians, most of the 
European Left, most Western governments, and most Western and Russian 
historians today. While Moscow officially recognized the Polish-Soviet 
frontier established in March 1921 by the Treaty of Riga, the Comintern 
(Communist International) claimed to support the principle of self-
determination and questioned Poland‘s right to both her western and eastern 
frontiers, but especially the eastern, Polish-Soviet frontier. Few Anglo-
American historians of twentieth-century Europe mention Józef Piłsudski‘s 
original aim of establishing a Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian federation allied 
with an independent Ukraine. When this goal proved unrealistic due to the 
Lithuanian and Ukrainian desire for independence and the Polish-Soviet 
War, he aimed at a strategically defensive frontier. The Treaty of Riga gave 
Poland less than Piłsudski wanted, but even so the majority of the population 
east of the Bug and San rivers — roughly equivalent to the Curzon Line of 
July 1920 and the eastern frontier of Poland since 1945 — was Ukrainian 
and Belarusian, plus a significant number of Jews. Nevertheless, Poles 
formed an overall minority of about 40% with majorities in the cities and 
regions of Białystok, Lwów (Ukr. Lviv), and Wilno (Lith.Vilnius). In view 
of all the factors mentioned above, every Polish foreign minister had a very 
difficult task before him: how to secure the existence of an independent 
Poland between her two traditional enemies, neither of whom viewed its 
frontiers with her as acceptable, while her Western ally France agreed with 
the British view on the need to revise the Polish-German settlement 
established by the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and also concluded an alliance 
with the USSR in 1935.  
  In this paper, I will discuss two key features of Polish foreign 
policy in the period 1933 — 1939, both of which were strongly criticized or 
even condemned at the time, and are still criticized or condemned by 
historians and journalists today. These two features are: (1) the Polish-
German Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 26, 1934, which was the 
joint achievement of Piłsudski and Foreign Minister Józef Beck, and (2) 
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Polish foreign policy during the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938, culminating in 
the annexation of two-thirds of western Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia, known in 
Polish as Zaolzie (the land across the Olza river), after the Munich 
Conference of September 29, 1938. At this conference, the leaders of 
Britain, France and Italy agreed to Adolf Hitler‘s annexation of a part of 
Czechoslovakia, the highly industrialized, mainly German-speaking 
Sudetenland (formerly, with the rest of Czechoslovakia, part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire), but postponed for three months decisions on Polish and 
Hungarian claims to Czechoslovak territory.  
  Before discussing Polish foreign policy, however, a few words are 
needed about Western perceptions of Piłsudski (1867-1935). He directed 
Polish foreign policy in the first years of independence as well as after his 
seizure of power in May 1926. A socialist leader in the struggle for 
independence before 1914, organizer of Polish legions in World War I, head 
of state in 1918-22, victor over the Red Army in 1920, and in power from 
1926 to his death, he is recognized by most Poles as the greatest Polish 
statesman of the twentieth century. In English-language historical literature 
and reference works, however, his policies are generally criticized and he is 
often described as a dictator.
2 
In fact, he was not a dictator, but developed an 
authoritarian form of government after seizing power in May 1926 and 
aimed for good relations with both of Poland‘s great neighbors. It is also 
worth noting that the Polish victories over the Red Army in 1920, which 
prevented the further spread of Soviet communism westward, are generally 
ignored in Anglo-American histories of twentieth-century Europe, while 
Piłsudski‘s previous march with Simon Petliura‘s Ukrainian divisions to 
Kiev (April–May 1920), if mentioned at all, is generally condemned.
3
 The 
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 For a discussion of negative views of Piłsudski, see Cienciala, ―Józef Piłsudski 
w Anglo-Amerykańskich informatorach i podręcznikach historycznych po 
drugiej wojnie światowej. Zagadnienie mitu-stereotypu negatywnego‖ [Józef 
Piłsudski in Anglo-American Reference Works and History Textbooks after 
World War II. The Problem of the Negative, Mythical Stereotype], in Wojciech 
Wrzesiński, ed., Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku [Polish Political Myths 
of the 19th and 20th Centuries] (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego, 1994), 167-194. For a positive but often ignored English-
language study of Piłsudski‘s seizure of power, see Joseph Rothschild, 
Pilsudski’s Coup d’Etat (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). 
3
 See: Cienciala, ―Historiografia anglosaska o wojnie polsko-sowieckiej i 
zwycięstwie polskim nad Armią Czerwoną w 1920 r.‖ [English-language 
Historiography on the Polish-Soviet War and the Polish Victory over the Red 
Army] in: Anna M. Cienciala, Piotr Wandycz, eds., Wojna Polsko-Bolszewicka 
1919-1920 w ocenach historyków [The Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 as 
Evaluated by Historians] (Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 2003), 41-54. 
A recent world history handbook states that Piłsudski ―led an unsuccessful 
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exception to this general condemnation is the textbook on European history 
by the best-known Western historian of Poland, Norman Davies. His work 
on the Polish-Soviet War is excellent although partly outdated, while some 
of his statements about Piłsudski and the Bolsheviks are somewhat strange.
4
 
Another exception is the balanced account given in Wikipedia under ―Polish-
Soviet War‖ (accessed November 2010), which has a good reading list.  
 Anglo-American historians of twentieth-century Europe also 
generally ignore the fact that Piłsudski originated the policy of ―equilibrium‖ 
— that is, balancing between Germany and the USSR — a policy carried out 
by his disciple, Beck, deputy foreign minister, 1930-1932, and minister from 
December 1932 until September 1939. The policy of equilibrium stemmed 
from Piłsudski‘s view, expressed to then Foreign Minister August Zaleski in 
May 1926, that the two canons of Polish diplomacy were ―one, strict 
neutrality between Germany and Russia, so that each of them would be 
absolutely certain that Poland would not go against it with the help of the 
other, and two, alliance with France and Romania as a guarantee of peace.‖
5
 
                                                                                                  
attack on the USSR in 1920.‖ See Józef (Klemens) Piłsudski, 1867-1935, 
Dictionary of World History, (NTC Pocket References, NTC Publishing Group, 
Linconlnwood, Illinois, 1997), 287. In a highly praised book, The Age of 
Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1994), the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm writes that the war was ―provoked 
by the territorial ambitions of Poland‖ which ―now demanded its eighteenth 
century frontiers [!]… Yet the Polish workers failed to rise and the Red Army 
was turned back at the gates of Warsaw‖ (p. 70). 
4
 Davies gives a very good, brief account of the war and its significance in his 
textbook, Europe: A History (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 934-937. In White Eagle-Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920 
(London: Macdonald, 1972; reprinted, London: Pimlico, Random House, 2003), 
Davies compares Piłsudski to a ―rhinoceros‖ … ―indestructible, myopic, 
unpredictable‖ (p. 66). He also compares the Bolsheviks, after their arrival in 
Poland, to ―unruly toddlers who had strayed from curiosity out of their political 
nursery and into the street‖ (p. 159). For a more recent study of the Polish-
Soviet War, see Adam Zamoyski, Warsaw 1920: Lenin’s Failed Conquest of 
Europe (London: Harper Press, 2008). See also Piotr S. Wandycz‘s excellent 
diplomatic study, Soviet-Polish Relations 1917-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967). For a detailed study of the negotiations leading to the 
Treaty of Riga, see Jerzy Borzęcki, The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the 
Creation of Interwar Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); 
Cienciala review, Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (2009): 667-668. 
5
 Cited by Piotr S. Wandycz in his article ―The Place of the French Alliance in 
Poland‘s Foreign Policy,‖ in Bâtir une Nouvelle Sécurité. La coopération 
militaire entre la France et les États d’Europe centrale et orientale de 1919 à 
1929 [Building New Security : The Military Cooperation between France and 
the States of Central and Eastern Europe from 1919 to 1929] (Château de 
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The policy of equilibrium was based on Poland‘s agreements with her two 
great, predatory neighbors: (a) The Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 
July 25, 1932, valid for three years,
 
and (b) The Polish-German Declaration 
of Non-Aggression of January 26, 1934, valid for ten years. In the Polish-
Soviet Pact, both sides agreed on the peaceful resolution of international 
disputes as well as that existing obligations were not obstacles to the 
peaceful development of their relations. They renounced the use of war and 
undertook not to aid the state committing aggression against the other party 
to the pact, or to participate in any clearly aggressive agreements against the 
other party.
6 
In the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression (not pact, 
because the German Foreign Ministry objected to the word as implying 
recognition of the Polish-German frontier), each party recognized the other‘s 
international commitments as well as the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
1928) that renounced wars of aggression and agreed to settle disputes by 
direct negotiations; if these failed, they would use other available 
procedures. The Polish-German declaration was, in turn, balanced in May 
1934 by the extension of the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact until 
December 31, 1945.
7
  
                                                                                                  
Vincennes : Centre d‘Études d‘Histoire de la Défense et Service Historique de 
l‘Armée de Terre, 2001), 189. The Franco-Polish alliance and military 
conventions were signed in Paris on February 19 1921; they concerned mutual 
aid against German aggression. The Polish-Romanian defensive alliance and 
military conventions were signed in Bucharest on March 3 1921; they concerned 
mutual aid in case of Soviet aggression and were renewed twice in the 1930s. 
6
 For the Polish text of the Polish-Soviet Pact of 1932, see Tadeusz Cieślak, I.A. 
Chrienow et al., eds., Dokumenty i materiały do stosunków polsko-radzieckich, 
Tom V, Maj 1926-Grudzień 1932 [Documents and Materials on Polish-Soviet 
Relations, vol. V, May 1926-December 1932] (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 
1966), doc. 322; parallel Russian volumes were published in Moscow. For the 
English translation, see Stanisław Biegański et al., eds., Documents on Polish-
Soviet Relations 1939-1945, vol. 1. 1939-1943 (London: Heinemann, 1961), 
doc. 6. The pact was to be automatically extended for two years, unless 
denounced by one of the two parties; for its extension in May 1934, see n.6 
below. 
7
 For the Polish text of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934, see Tadeusz 
Jędruszczak and Maria Nowak-Kiełbikowa eds., Dokumenty z dziejów polskiej 
polityki zagranicznej 1918-1939, tom II, 1933-1939 [Documents on the History 
of Polish Foreign Policy 1918-1939, vol. 2, 1933-1939] (Warsaw: Instytut 
Wydawniczy PAX, 1996), doc. 8. For the English translation of the equally 
valid German text, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, ser. C, v. II 
(published jointly by His Majesty‘s Stationery Office, London, and The 
Department of State, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1959), 
doc. 219; the same volumes in both series, C and D, were published in French 
and German. For the extension of the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, see 
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 These two agreements were the basis of Polish foreign policy until 
war loomed on the horizon in spring 1939; they were also based on the 
principle that Poland could never be dependent on either Germany or Russia. 
A concise statement defining Polish foreign policy was made in January 
1935 by Beck to French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval, to whom he repeated 
what Piłsudski had told former Foreign Minister Louis Barthou during the 
latter‘s visit to Poland in April 1934: 
 
Polish policy is based on the following elements: I. Our 
geographical location and historical experience both show that our 
decisive problems consist of Poland‘s neighborly relations with 
Germany and Russia. These problems absorb most of our political 
work and our limited means of action. History teaches us that the 
greatest catastrophe to affect our nation resulted from the activity of 
those two states. And secondly, in the desperate situation in which 
we then found ourselves, no state in the world could be found to 
hasten with help to us. 
Therefore, our key interests depend on the solution of this 
basic problem. A further conclusion is the conviction that Warsaw‘s 
policy can never depend either on Moscow or Berlin. I am recalling 
this conversation [between Piłsudski and Barthou] because these are 
the limits of what is politically possible for us. Facts and concepts 
that go outside these principles will always force us to say: non 
possumus [we cannot].  
 In re-born Poland — just as at the end of the eighteenth 
century — it was clear that we had to achieve good fortune with 
these two partners by ourselves.  
 
In this concise statement, Beck explained why Poland could not participate 
in multilateral agreements that would endanger her bilateral agreements with 
Germany and the USSR. On this occasion, Beck also disagreed with Laval‘s 
flattering statement that Poland was a Great Power; he said she was not such 
because she conducted a regional, not a global policy.
8
 
                                                                                                  
Dokumenty z dziejów, 2, doc. 22; English text in Documents on Polish-Soviet 
Relations, 1, doc. 10. 
8
 ―Notatka z rozmów Pana Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Becka z Ministrem 
Spraw Zagranicznych Francji, Lavalem, dnia 16 i 19 stycznia w Genewie‖ [Note 
on the conversations of Foreign Minister Beck with French Foreign Minister 
Laval, 16 and 19 January 1935 at Geneva], Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 
sygn. 108, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ref. no. 108, 
Archive of Modern Documents], Warsaw; translated by Cienciala. I thank Dr. 
Hab. Docent Marek Kornat for making this document available to me. Louis 
Barthou paid a state visit to Poland in April 1934; on his policy aims, see Piotr 
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 The first of the two bilateral agreements mentioned above, the 
Polish-Soviet pact of July 1932, was in line with the budding Franco-Soviet 
rapprochement of the time, so it was welcome to Poland‘s ally, France. This 
was not, however, the case with the Polish-German Declaration of Non-
Aggression which, negotiated independently of France, was a shock to Paris, 
arousing suspicions of Poland that grew stronger over time. It was described 
by British historian Hugh Seton-Watson as the first breach in the French 
alliance system, that is: the Franco-Polish alliance and military convention 
signed in Paris, February 19, 1921, and the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, 
signed in Paris, January 25, 1924. France signed these alliances to restrain 
Germany in the East after the Anglo-American guarantee to aid her in case 
of German aggression in the West fell through with the U.S. rejection of 
membership in the League of Nations and thus the Versailles Treaty. 
According to Seton-Watson, the declaration began a period of Polish-
German cooperation that helped Hitler rearm, isolate Austria, and finally 
dismember Czechoslovakia. Beck‘s policy allegedly aimed at the German 
destruction of Bolshevik Russia, with some territorial gains for Poland, and 
then Polish neutrality in a war between Germany and the Western Powers. 
Seton-Watson wrote the classic statement of British interwar left-wing 
intellectuals‘ views of Polish foreign policy of the time. Part of this 
statement reads:  
 
The basis of Polish policy, then, was not love of Germany but a 
combination of territorial greed, fear of revolution on the part of the 
landowners and colonels, mistrust of the strength and will to 
resistance of the Western Powers, and the supreme confidence of 
Colonel Beck in his own Machiavellian genius. This policy played 
an important part in the preparation of German plans for Eastern 
Europe.
9
  
 
In 1962 Seton-Watson explained that his book — written during his military 
service in World War II — reflected the British mood and hopes of the time, 
which he shared. As it turned out, his description of what he called Polish, or 
Beck‘s foreign policy, was to influence several generations of English-
                                                                                                  
S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances 1926-1936 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), ch. 11. In January 1935, the French 
government was trying to mount an ―Eastern Locarno‖ pact, involving the 
USSR, Germany, and Poland. The aim was to use Moscow to check Berlin; the 
project did not get off the ground because Germany rejected it, so Poland‘s 
rejection was not decisive for its failure. 
9
 Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Hamden, 
CT: Archon Books, 1962) (3
rd
 ed.), 389. 
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speaking historians up to the present.
10
 The durability of these views is 
evident in a textbook on interwar Europe written by a Canadian historian of 
twentieth-century international relations and published in 2006. The author 
claims that Piłsudski and Beck envisaged joining Hitler in a crusade against 
the Soviet Union.
11
 Indeed, the European left-wing press saw the 
Declaration of Non-Aggression, like the Soviet press which inspired it, as a 
class-based anti-Soviet policy. Rumors or outright charges that it contained a 
secret protocol directed against the USSR circulated for years to come. Not 
only were they a staple of Soviet histories of the interwar period, but they 
are still touted by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. An 
alleged documentary film shown on a Russian state-owned TV channel in 
late August 2009
 
depicted Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck as a German 
agent.
12 
 
 There was, of course, no secret protocol to the Polish-German 
agreement of 1934, nor was it a breach in the French alliance system, 
                                            
10
 Seton-Watson, ibid., xii. For a critical study of interpretations of the 
declaration, see Cienciala, ―The Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 26, 
1934 in Polish-German and International Relations: A Reappraisal,‖ East 
European Quarterly, 1, no. 1 (1967): 1-30, and idem, ―Polish Foreign Policy, 
1926-1939. ‗Equilibrium:‘ Stereotype and Reality, ‖ in Alexander Korczyński 
and Tadeusz Świętochowski eds., Poland Between Germany and Russia 1926-
1939: The Theory of Two Enemies (New York: Piłsudski Institute of America, 
1975), 44-59. For a detailed study of contemporary reactions to the Polish-
German declaration in Western and East European countries as well as by 
Poland‘s German minority, see Mieczysław Wojciechowski, ed., Deklaracja 
polsko-niemiecka o niestosowaniu przemocy z dnia 26 stycznia 1934 r. z 
perspektywy Polski i Europy w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę podpisania [The 
Polish-German Declaration on Excluding the Use of Force of January 26, 1934, 
from the Perspective of Poland and Europe on the Seventieth Anniversary of its 
Signing] (Toruń: Centrum Edukacji Europejskiej, 2005). 
11
 Martin Kitchen, Europe Between The Wars (New York and London: 
Pearson/Longman, 2006) (2
nd
 ed.), 187. For a repetition of Seton-Watson‘s view 
of Beck‘s policy without citing the source, see Adrian Webb, The Routledge 
Companion to Central and Eastern Europe since 1919 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 11. 
12
 On the charges of a secret protocol directed at the USSR, as recorded in 
diplomatic documents, see Marek Kornat, ―Pakt, którego nie było...(Pogłoski o 
rzekomym tajnym układzie polsko-niemieckim w latach 1934-1938)‖ [The Pact 
which did not exist…(Rumors about an alleged, secret Polish-German Pact in 
the years 1934-1938)], in idem, Polityka równowagi 1934-1939. Polska między 
Wschodem a Zachodem [The Policy of Equilibrium 1934-1938. Poland between 
East and West] (Kraków: Arkana Historii, 2007), 229-306. The Russian TV 
documentary was titled ―Sekrety Tainykh Protokolov‖ [The Secrets of Secret 
Protocols]. The film was shown on channel ―Rossiya‖ on August 21, 2009. 
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although French diplomats and military leaders saw it as such. In fact, this 
was hardly the case because the alliances hardly constituted a ―system.‖ 
France‘s allies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, were deeply divided by a 
territorial dispute as well as very different perceptions of the USSR. 
Furthermore, France had been trying to water down the Polish alliance for 
years. The beginnings of this French policy were described and analyzed by 
Piotr S. Wandycz in 1962 but it did not become more widely known, at least 
to French speakers, until 1981. The author of a masterly French analysis of 
this process traced it to the victory of the ―Cartel des Gauches‖ (Left-Wing 
Coalition) in June 1924, followed by French negotiations for the Locarno 
Treaties of October 1925.
13
 In fact, the roots of Polish policy leading to the 
German-Polish agreement of 1934 go back to the Locarno Treaties, when 
Germany recognized her post-World War I western frontiers, which were 
then guaranteed in a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, signed by Belgium, 
Britain, France, and Italy. To balance this, France signed separate Treaties of 
Mutual Assistance with her allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland, but French 
military aid to each country was now dependent on the machinery of the 
League of Nations: France could only come to their aid if they were the 
victims of unprovoked aggression and the League of Nations Council failed 
to reach unanimous consent in identifying the aggressor. Germany signed 
arbitration treaties with all her neighbors, including Poland, but frontier 
issues were excluded in its arbitration treaty with the latter, and Germany 
also rejected a French guarantee of the treaties.
14
 It is worth noting that the 
Soviet government saw the Locarno Treaties as directed against the USSR, 
evidently assuming that the signatories would aid Poland or/and Romania in 
a war with Soviet Russia, which was most unlikely given the wording of the 
formula on aid to be extended by League members to victims of unprovoked 
aggression. Furthermore, German-Soviet relations, established by the 
                                            
13
 See Georges-Henri Soutou, ―L‘Alliance franco-polonaise 1925-1933 ou 
comment s‘en débarasser?― [The Franco-Polish Alliance 1925-1933, or How to 
Get Rid of it?], Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 2/3/4 (1981): 295-348. For a 
succinct description of the French alliance system up to 1936, see Piotr S. 
Wandycz, Twilight, 3-16. For a well-documented study of French security 
policy as well as French views of Polish-Czechoslovak relations and efforts to 
establish military cooperation between them, see Isabelle Davion, Mon voisin, 
cet ennemi. La politique de sécurité française face aux relations polono-
tchéchoslovaques entre 1919 et 1939 [My Neighbor, that Enemy: French 
Security Policy in the Face of Polish-Czechoslovak Relations between 1919 and 
1939] (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009). 
14
 On the Locarno Treaties, see Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, ch. 13, 
and idem, Twilight, ch. 1; also Anna M. Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki, From 
Versailles to Locarno: Keys to Polish Foreign Policy 1919-1925 (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984), chs. 9 and 10. 
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Rapallo Treaty (April 1922), were excellent at this time. Reinforced by the 
Treaty of Berlin (April 1926), they included secret Soviet-German military 
cooperation, especially the development of war planes, tanks, and parachute 
troops — which allowed Germany to bypass the Versailles Treaty 
prohibition of offensive weapons for German armed forces.
15 
Gustav 
Stresemann, who supported this policy, received the Nobel Peace Prize for 
the Locarno Treaties, together with French Prime Minister Aristide Briand 
and British Prime Minister Austen Chamberlain. German-Soviet military 
cooperation was a constant threat to Poland until Hitler ended it in 1933 as 
part of his anti-communist policies.  
 The clear discrimination of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 
Locarno Treaties was mainly due to British policy, for Britain had refused to 
include Poland and Czechoslovakia in a Franco-British security agreement 
as proposed by the French in December 1921. She also refused to sign ―The 
Geneva Protocol‖ in 1924. The protocol, worked out by Polish Foreign 
Minister Aleksander Skrzyński and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard 
Beneš, mandated compulsory arbitration; if this failed, League of Nations 
members were to come to the aid of any member who was the victim of 
aggression. A year later, Skrzyński signed the Locarno Treaties for Poland, 
believing that she must be part of the European political system. Piłsudski 
(out of government since May 1923) was outraged. Beck noted that the 
marshal condemned the Locarno Treaties for consolidating the unequal 
balance between East and West [in Europe] and set himself the goal of 
redressing it.
16
  
                                            
15
 German Foreign Minister Stresemann obtained a formula on aid to victims of 
aggression that allowed Germany to safeguard its relations with the USSR. It 
stated that each member of the League of Nations was to extend aid as far as its 
geographical and military position allowed; see Cienciala and Komarnicki, 
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nd
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Bushuyeva, The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarized 
Germany and Paved the Way to Fascism, 1922-1933 (Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1995). 
16
 On Skrzyński, see Piotr S. Wandycz, Aleksander Skrzyński. Minister Spraw 
Zagranicznych II Rzeczypospolitej [Aleksander Skrzyński: Foreign Minister of 
the Second Polish Republic] (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych, 2006); Cienciala review, TPR, 52, no. 1 (2007): 115-120. 
For Piłsudski‘s comment on Locarno, see Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 
1926-1932*. Na podstawie tekstów min. Józefa Becka opracowała Anna M. 
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 Redressing the balance in Poland‘s favor, however, was not feasible 
for several years after Locarno because neither Weimar Germany nor the 
USSR accepted its frontiers with Poland, even though Moscow had 
recognized them in the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921.
17
 Weimar 
Germany aimed at the recovery of most — and if possible, all — of former 
Prussian Poland, especially the preponderantly German Danzig, as well as 
the Polish-speaking ―Polish Corridor‖ separating East Prussia from the rest 
of Germany, both established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Piłsudski 
and Beck, as well as most Poles, considered both as vital to Polish 
independence, and both were to figure prominently in the approach to war in 
1939. Some Anglo-American historians of twentieth-century Europe, 
however, do not seem to know the origins of these settlements and their 
primary importance to Poland, so it is useful to summarize the main facts. 
Danzig had been the port city of pre-partition Poland; it was taken by Prussia 
in 1793, despite strong resistance by its German-speaking citizens, who 
revolted unsuccessfully against Prussian rule in 1797. The American, 
British, and French members of the Commission on Polish Affairs at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had advocated awarding Danzig, as well as 
Polish-speaking regions in the southern part of East Prussia and the railway 
from Warsaw to Danzig, to Poland. They argued that it was more equitable 
to give twenty million Poles free access to the sea at the expense of two 
million Germans (estimated to live in future Poland) than to satisfy the 
Germans by leaving Danzig and the Polish Corridor to an aggressive 
Germany. This, it was argued, would make Poland a vassal state, and in any 
case most of the population in the Polish Corridor was Polish. However, 
when the French government agreed to accept an Anglo-American guarantee 
in case of German aggression against France, it also agreed to a compromise 
solution for Danzig in the shape of a self-governing Free City, with Polish 
rights therein and under the protection of the League of Nations. A 
contributing factor to this decision was President Woodrow Wilson‘s desire 
to have a precedent for the port city of Trieste, which he did not want 
awarded either to Italy or to Yugoslavia. Also, it was decided that plebiscites 
would be held in southern East Prussia. They took place as the Red Army 
                                                                                                  
Cienciała, [Polish Foreign Policy in the Years 1926-1932,* edited by Anna M. 
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was advancing on Warsaw in 1920 and, as the mostly Protestant Poles were 
promised extensive cultural rights, the majority voted for Germany. The 
―Polish Corridor‖ (annexed by Prussia in the First Partition of Poland, 1772) 
was awarded to Poland on ethnic grounds. Indeed, according to the Prussian 
Census of 1910, 42.5% of the population was German (a percentage 
probably lower in reality because the census did not include children, and it 
shrank rapidly after 1918 when many Germans opted to leave). Despite 
these facts, some Anglo-American historians state today that the Polish 
Corridor was preponderantly German, so awarding it to Poland violated the 
principle of self-determination.
18
 Another German grievance against the 
Versailles Treaty was the division of Upper Silesia. President Wilson and 
the Peace Conference experts had advocated the award of the whole of this 
heavily industrialized province on an ethnic basis to Poland, but British 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George persuaded Wilson and French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau against it so the Versailles Treaty mandated a 
plebiscite, which took place in March 1921. After three Polish uprisings, the 
League of Nations awarded the eastern part of Upper Silesia (East of the 
Oder River) to Poland in 1922, mainly on the basis of the plebiscite results 
there, although the overall vote including the preponderantly German 
western part of the region (not claimed by the Poles) gave a majority for 
Germany. Special arrangements were made to preserve the economic unity 
of the province, allowing Germany to import 500,000 tons of coal a year 
duty free; she ceased to do so in 1925 when she began a tariff war with 
Poland.
19  
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Paul Latawski, ed., The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-23 (London: 
Macmillan, 1992), 72-75; also idem and Komarnicki, From Versailles to 
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 ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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Czechoslovakia (London: Haus, 2010), 79. 
19
 For an excellent summary and analysis of Polish issues at the Paris Peace 
Conference, see Piotr S. Wandycz, ―The Polish Question,‖ in The Treaty of 
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These settlements, probably the most equitable that could be made 
at the time, were highly resented by Germany, whose claims for their return 
enjoyed much sympathy in the West, especially in Britain, which 
traditionally viewed Eastern Europe as a sphere of German and Russian 
interests and — in the interwar period — only of German interests. In a 
letter written after the Munich Conference to the British Ambassador in 
Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax wrote that 
Germany could now do what she wanted in the region and it was none of 
Britain‘s business, adding: ―Incidentally, I have always felt myself that, once 
Germany recovered her normal strength, this predominance was inevitable 
for obvious geographical reasons.‖ He also thought that Danzig and the 
Corridor were the most harmful decisions of the Versailles Treaty. Indeed, a 
Foreign Office paper of February 1933 had suggested the best solution 
would be the return of Danzig to Germany and a German corridor through 
the ―Polish Corridor.‖
20
 This was totally unacceptable to the Poles because it 
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would have left their access to Danzig and the nearby port city of Gdynia 
dependent on (nonexistent) German good will. German policy was directed 
at revising the Versailles Treaty and, as stated earlier, this generally meant a 
return to the German eastern frontier of 1914.
21
 By the mid-nineteen thirties, 
the bulk of Polish foreign trade went through Danzig and Gdynia. The latter 
was a Polish port city built in the Polish Corridor, beginning in 1923, to give 
her port of her own and to supplement Danzig; it carried about half of the 
trade by 1938. Thus, the existence of the Free City of Danzig, with 
guaranteed Polish economic and cultural rights therein, as well as the 
existence of the Polish Corridor were, for the vast majority of Poles, 
synonymous with Polish independence. As noted above, the Allied experts 
in the Commission on Polish Affairs at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 
had agreed and even advocated the award of Danzig to Poland. 
 Piłsudski saw his chance to redress the imbalance created by the 
Locarno Treaties after Hitler came to power in early 1933. The Führer had 
earlier issued the same vituperations and claims against Poland as the 
German statesmen before him. Therefore, on March 6, the day after the Nazi 
electoral victory in Germany, Piłsudski sent additional Polish troops to 
strengthen the garrison at the Polish arms depot serving Polish warships at 
Westerplatte in the Bay of Danzig. This was a warning to Hitler that Poland 
would fight if he tried to seize the Free City, where the Nazis were very 
active. Hitler took note of the warning and showed interest in improving 
relations with Poland, aiming to draw her away from France. Piłsudski, who 
had signed the Franco-Polish alliance in 1921, never thought of giving it up 
but was glad to improve relations with Germany. Polish-German talks began 
after Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations as well as the 
Disarmament Conference in October 1933, which led to negotiations for the 
Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression signed on January 26, 1934. 
Now the Western Powers had no more incentive, at least for a while, to 
discuss the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany. An anecdote 
attributed to Piłsudski at the time had him say that Poland had moved on the 
Western menu from the place of hors d‘oeuvres to that of dessert.
22
 The 
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view he expressed to his closest military and foreign policy advisers was, 
however, pessimistic. According to a politician close to Piłsudski, in March 
1934 the marshal said he thought good Polish-German relations might last 
for perhaps four years and he could not guarantee more. According to a 
general, in April that year Piłsudski said: ―Having those two pacts [with 
Germany and Russia] we are sitting on two stools — that can‘t last long. We 
must know… which one we will fall off first and when.‖
23
 This is 
remarkably similar to the opinion of an American historian, Henry L. 
Roberts, who called the policy of equilibrium (which he attributed to Beck) a 
dubious proposition of ―riding two horses at once.‖ The policy of 
equilibrium, given Poland‘s predatory neighbors was, however, the only one 
she could pursue as long as it was possible to do so, while maintaining her 
alliance with France. It is also clear that Piłsudski‘s distrust of Soviet Russia 
did not blind him to the threat of Nazi Germany.
24
 
 
 The policy initiated with the Polish-German Declaration of Non-
Aggression did not — as per Seton-Watson and others — aim at cooperation 
with Nazi Germany against the USSR and gaining territory in Soviet 
Ukraine. Both Piłsudski and Beck refused to take up such German 
suggestions. In fact, Beck told the U.S. ambassador in Warsaw, Anthony J. 
Drexel Biddle, in June 1938 that Poland would never agree to a German 
march through Polish territory to Soviet Ukraine. On the contrary, said 
Beck, Poland would resist such a German move because a German 
occupation of Ukraine would threaten Poland‘s peace and independence. He 
also said that in such a case Poland would face possible
 
defeat, but she 
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would ―bleed‖ Germany while war between Britain and France in the West
 
would prevent the Germans from reaching their goal.
25
  
 After Piłsudski‘s death on May 12, 1935, Beck continued the 
Marshal‘s foreign policy goals and methods. Since Beck was presented 
mainly as a pro-German statesman in Soviet, East European Communist-era 
historical as well as in post-Soviet studies, and is still presented as such in 
many Anglo-American studies, a brief biographical-political sketch is in 
order. Born in Warsaw on October 4, 1894, Beck was, against his parents‘ 
wishes, baptized in a Russian Orthodox Church because his mother belonged 
to the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church, which had been forcibly 
incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, but was baptized in a 
Catholic Church several years later. Beck‘s father, an active socialist but not 
a revolutionary, was sentenced for illegal activity, imprisoned for a few 
months in Russia, and then exiled to Riga, whence he moved with his family 
to Austrian Poland and settled in Limanowa. Young Beck grew up in a 
patriotic Polish household. He completed high school in Kraków; briefly 
studied engineering at the Lwów Politechnic, but transferred to the Export 
Academy in Vienna in 1913-1914. When war broke out, he immediately 
volunteered for Piłsudski‘s Legion (part of the Austro-Hungarian army), 
serving in the artillery; he was decorated for bravery in a battle with the 
Russian army in 1916. When Piłsudski broke with Germany and Austria-
Hungary in summer 1917 and was interned in the German fortress of 
Magdeburg, Beck was interned in Sopron, Hungary. He left (on a holiday 
pass!) in early 1918 to work for Piłsudski‘s secret Polish Military 
Organization [Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, P.O.W.] in revolutionary 
Russia; its job was to find Polish soldiers and officers formerly in the 
Russian army as well as prisoners-of-war from the German and Austro-
Hungarian armies, and bring them home to join the Polish armed forces 
there.  
 Beck‘s reports from Russia impressed Piłsudski, who assigned him 
to in the Polish military intelligence service in 1920; sent him on special 
missions; and appointed him Military Attaché in Paris (also Brussels), where 
he served in 1922-1923 and was recalled to Warsaw in the fall of that year. 
The charge that Beck had been removed because he was caught trying to 
steal French military secrets for the Germans in Vienna was proved a 
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fabrication at the time, for the French newspaper that printed it had to recant 
and apologize. Information on this matter has been available for years but 
the charge is still repeated by some Western historians and by Russian 
media, which even cast him as a German agent as late as August 2009.
26
 
Most Western historians are also ignorant of the fact that Polish military 
authorities congratulated Beck for improving Polish-French relations, that he 
was made a chevalier of the French Legion of Honor in April 1923 and an 
officer of the same in 1927 — hardly decorations for a German spy. After 
obtaining a diploma from the Higher School of Military Studies for general 
staff officers in Warsaw (in which he obtained top ranking together with his 
colleague, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski), Beck received the rank of 
colonel of horse artillery. He worked as Piłsudski‘s chef de cabinet [CEO] 
when the marshal was minister of defense and later premier, in 1926-30; was 
briefly deputy premier in 1930 when Piłsudski was premier again, and 
deputy foreign minister to Zaleski in 1930-32, succeeding the latter as 
minister in November 1932.
27
 Thus, while Beck had little diplomatic 
experience, he had intimate knowledge of the marshal‘s goals and methods. 
He was devoted to Piłsudski and determined to continue his policy of 
balancing between Germany and the USSR while maintaining the alliance 
with France. He also continued the marshal‘s policy of seeking closer 
relations with Britain and, like him, did not expect Austria and 
Czechoslovakia to survive unless supported by France and Britain, which 
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both statesmen considered doubtful. (Czechoslovak statesmen expressed the 
same opinion about Poland and did not want any alliance with her to avoid 
involvement in a Polish-German war.) Piłsudski, for his part, had a high 
opinion of Beck. The marshal rarely praised any person who worked for 
him, but a former prime minister recalled his statement to Beck at a meeting 
of former prime ministers in spring 1934: ―In my work on Poland‘s foreign 
policy I found an especially able and intelligent co-worker in the person of 
the foreign minister. I cannot compliment you enough, Mr. Beck.‖
28
  
 There is no document specifying Piłsudski‘s instructions to Beck on 
what policy to follow after his death. Beck notes, however, that at the turn of 
1931-1932 the marshal agreed with his view that the outstanding issues to be 
settled were the following: Danzig, the Minorities Treaty, Lithuania, and 
Teschen Silesia.
29
 Beck handled these problems according to Piłsudski‘s 
wishes. The Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 1934 
was followed by better relations between Poland and the Free City of 
Danzig, which the marshal called the touchstone of Polish-German relations 
and Beck always considered as such.
30
 The formal German recognition of 
the Free City‘s status and of the Polish-German frontier was the perennial 
goal of Polish foreign policy. The Nazis won the city elections in 1935 but 
were generally kept in check by Berlin until spring 1939, while Poland 
quietly granted asylum to anti-Nazi refugees. The Minorities Treaty, which 
all new East European states had to sign in 1919, safeguarded minority 
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— 30 September 1939 (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 
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rights in these states while Germany, with a Polish minority of about one 
million (approximately the same as the number of Germans in Poland), did 
not have to sign it. Members of the German minority in Poland were 
encouraged by pre-Nazi governments to use the League of Nations as a 
forum to protest real or imagined violations of their rights, while the Polish 
minority in Germany had no such recourse and had a difficult existence even 
after the Declaration of Non-Aggression.
31
 In November 1937, however, the 
Polish and German governments signed a declaration on the rights of their 
respective minorities.
32
 The Polish government could do nothing to aid its 
minority in the USSR, which numbered about two million after the Treaty of 
Riga, tens of thousands of whom managed to repatriate to Poland. It was 
greatly reduced during the years of forced collectivization in 1930-32, 
mainly in Ukraine, and was to suffer greatly during the Stalin Terror.
33 
Moscow did not sign the Minorities Treaty and the Comintern supported the 
inclusion of Poland‘s eastern territories in the Belorussian and Ukrainian 
Soviet Republics. It is not surprising, therefore, that Beck declared Poland‘s 
abrogation of the Minorities Treaty when the USSR joined the League of 
Nations in September 1934, while confirming the constitutional rights of 
minorities in Poland. Lithuania had broken off all relations with Poland after 
the Polish seizure of Wilno in 1920, although in a plebiscite boycotted by 
the Lithuanian minority, the Polish majority in the region voted for union 
with Poland in 1922. Lithuania, whose constitution named Wilno as the 
country‘s capital, rejected all efforts, including Piłsudski‘s, to re-establish 
normal relations. When Hitler annexed Austria in March 1938, the Polish 
Government feared he might annex the preponderantly German port city of 
Klaipėda (German: Memel) in Lithuania and place German troops on the 
Polish-Lithuanian border. Beck then decided to send an ultimatum to the 
Lithuanian government demanding the establishment of normal relations. 
The pretext was the accidental shooting of a Polish soldier by a Lithuanian 
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frontier guard. The ultimatum (with a forty-eight hour limit) was used 
because it was clear that only the threat of force would persuade the 
Lithuanian government to re-establish normal relations while Wilno 
remained in Poland. The Lithuanian government acquiesced.
34
 This left the 
issue of Danzig and the Polish Corridor and that of Cieszyn Silesia or 
Zaolzie, which Piłsudski, like most Poles, aimed to unite with Poland. In 
1932, it was agreed that no political relaxation was possible in relations with 
Czechoslovakia without an improvement of the fate of Poles in Zaolzie. 
 While carrying out Piłsudski‘s foreign policy objectives, Beck never 
wavered in observing the marshal‘s key principles of foreign policy. Aside 
from the priority of Poland‘s relations with Germany and Soviet Russia, the 
marshal also held that there should be no bowing unless it was necessary. 
This was directed at what the marshal considered Polish servile behavior 
toward France and translated as insistence that the Polish nation and its 
representatives be treated with dignity. Beck expressed this by being stiff 
and sometimes abrupt when subjected to patronizing treatment by French 
statesmen, and such behavior was often seen as arrogance. Of course, 
Piłsudski did not need to stress the old Polish slogan Nic o nas bez nas 
[―Nothing (is to be decided) about us without us‖]. It was the rallying call of 
both Polish nobles against the king in pre-partition Poland  — meaning he 
could decide nothing without their consent in the Sejm [Parliament] — as 
well as Polish workers and their supporters in the Solidarity movement of 
1980-1981 and Solidarity underground structures in 1981-89. To Piłsudski 
and Beck this principle meant that Poland would not accept any decisions 
made by the Great Powers in matters that involved her interests. Beck‘s 
insistence on this principle was misread, especially by the French, as a 
pretension to Poland‘s great power status — a claim he denied while 
admitting that she was a regional power. Finally, there was the principle of 
―Honor.‖ The old Polish military motto, inscribed on army sabers, was: Bóg, 
Honor i Ojczyzna [―God, Honor and Fatherland‖]. Honor meant honorable 
behavior according to the traditional noble code and holding others to the 
same standard. Above all, however, honor meant that Poles were bound to 
defend their independence; to give it up without a fight was considered 
dishonorable and shameful.  
We now come to the most frequently condemned feature of interwar 
Polish foreign policy, condemned not only by Soviet, Russian, and most 
Western historians but also by many Polish historians today, that is, the 
method used to gain Zaolzie from Czechoslovakia on September 30, 1938. 
This policy should be viewed in both the international and national contexts 
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of the time. In the first — and decisive — international context, Britain and 
France wanted to avoid war with Nazi Germany. Therefore, they followed 
the policy of ―appeasement,‖ allowing Hitler to begin openly rearming 
Germany in 1935. The following year, they allowed him to militarize the 
Rhineland, which had been demilitarized to provide security for France. This 
demilitarized area was also crucial for France‘s immediate aid to her Eastern 
allies, if attacked by Germany, since France could start military action in 
German territory bereft of German troops and without having to cross the 
Rhine. Finally, French, British, and Italian leaders agreed at the Munich 
Conference of September 29, 1938, to Hitler‘s annexation of the 
Sudetenland, the predominantly German-speaking part of Czechoslovakia. 
Poland, and Beck personally, were and still are excoriated for using an 
ultimatum, that is, the threat of force, to annex the western part of Zaolzie, 
after the Munich Conference. This action is still widely condemned as Polish 
cooperation with Hitler, and even as initiated by him.
35
 
 
 In evaluating Polish policy toward Czechoslovakia in 1938, one 
must bear in mind the national context, that is, the history of Zaolzie and its 
place in Polish-Czechoslovak relations. The area east and west of the Olza 
River, formerly known as the Duchy of Teschen, was part of the region of 
Moravská Ostrava. The duchy had been part of Poland in the twelfth 
century; from the mid-fourteenth century it was part of Bohemia, which was 
defeated and annexed by Austria in 1620. Meanwhile, the duchy was ruled 
by the Silesian branch of the Polish Piast dynasty until it died out in 1625, 
when it came into the possession of the Austrian Habsburgs and stayed as 
such to November 1918. At that time, Zaolzie, covering two thirds of the 
western part of the duchy, had a clear Polish majority, a fact recognized in 
the agreement concluded by local Polish and Czech councils to divide the 
area into Polish and Czech administrative regions. The Czechoslovak 
government, however, did not recognize the local agreement; it claimed 
Zaolzie as part of the historic lands of the Bohemian Crown. It also claimed 
that Czechoslovakia needed the region‘s Karvina coal mines, which 
provided high-grade coking coal for the steel and engineering industries of 
the region, as well as the town of Cieszyn because it was the key railway 
junction between Bohemia and Slovakia. Piłsudski sent a special delegation 
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to Prague to negotiate an agreement with the Czechoslovak government in 
December 1918, but the delegates found it unwilling to do so. In early 1919, 
just before elections to the Polish parliament, and while most Polish troops 
were fighting the Ukrainians over Eastern Galicia and resisting the Red 
Army elsewhere, Czech troops moved into the region and, after some 
bloodshed, took it over. They were forced to leave by the Western Allies, 
but the latter awarded the region to Czechoslovakia in late July 1920, as the 
Red Army was advancing on Warsaw. Furthermore, at that time, French 
military supplies for the Polish army were denied transit through 
Czechoslovakia, and a Hungarian proposal to send troops through 
Czechoslovak territory to help the Poles was rejected. The Allied decision 
and the Czechoslovak actions noted above were bitterly resented in Poland, 
as was the Czechoslovak government‘s support of massive Czech settlement 
in the predominantly Polish areas of Zaolzie and its policy of assimilating 
the Poles, especially through the schools.
36
  
 All the above factors made Zaolzie a very emotional issue in 
Poland, poisoning Polish-Czechoslovak relations. These were worsened by 
the asylum granted in Czechoslovakia — mainly in Subcarpathian Ruthenia 
— to Ukrainian nationalists who had fought against the Poles in East Galicia 
in 1918-1919, as well as to those who later actively opposed Polish rule. 
Every political leader and party in Poland, except the communists, believed 
that Zaolzie must be united with Poland. Even General Władysław Sikorski, 
a bitter opponent of the Beck-Piłsudski policy of good relations with 
Germany, was ready to offer Prague an alliance with Warsaw if he came to 
power — but only if Zaolzie went to Poland.
37
 The Poles also resented the 
Czechoslovak-Soviet Alliance of May 1935, which was the eastern pendant 
to the Franco-Soviet Alliance concluded at that time.  
 It was, however, the international context which was decisive for 
Polish policy in 1938. An important factor to be noted before the 
Czechoslovak crisis began in earnest (in May 1938) is that Beck knew of 
British willingness to accept border changes favoring Germany in East 
Central Europe which would, of course, affect Poland. In early December 
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1937, the German Foreign Ministry informed a member of the Polish 
embassy in Berlin of Lord Halifax‘s statements to Hitler at their meeting in 
Berchtesgaden on November 19, 1937. Halifax, then Lord President of the 
Council, spoke for Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when he told Hitler 
that Britain would not insist on maintaining the status quo of 1919 (that is, 
the Versailles Treaty). Therefore, changes were possible — provided they 
were carried out peacefully. Here Halifax mentioned Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Danzig.
38
 
 
 It was in the dual international and national context described above 
that Beck set out Polish policy on Czechoslovakia in early January 1938. At 
this time, the Nazi Sudeten German Party (SGP) was growing ever louder in 
its resentment of Czech rule. (It was not known at the time that Hitler 
planned to use the principle of self-determination, identified with the SGP, 
to destroy Czechoslovakia, the ally of France and of the USSR, and then 
proceed to attack France and conquer Western Europe.) Beck stated that any 
Czechoslovak decision favoring one minority would be viewed by Poland as 
an unfriendly act if not applied to the Polish minority.
39
 A few days later, on 
January 14, 1938, he learned from his conversation with the Führer in Berlin 
that the latter planned to move against Austria, which he planned to unite 
with Germany; also that he viewed Czechoslovakia as being under Soviet 
influence, but would seek a peaceful agreement with it on the treatment of 
the German minority — unless compelled to do otherwise. Hitler also 
declared that Polish rights in Danzig and its legal status would not be 
diminished. At this time, Beck also spoke with Hermann Göring, marshal of 
the Luftwaffe and head of Germany‘s Four Year [Rearmament] Plan, who 
said he considered the further existence of Czechoslovakia in its present 
shape as impossible. When Beck learned of German plans to takeover 
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Austria, he did not oppose them since it was obvious that Britain and France 
would not oppose Hitler.
40
  
 
Beck welcomed Hitler‘s assurance regarding Danzig because he 
feared the status of the Free City might be revised or even abolished at the 
forthcoming meeting of the League of Nations on account of Nazi violations 
of the Danzig constitution, whose official protector was the League of 
Nations, while its real guarantors were France and Britain. Therefore, at the 
same time as keeping in touch with Berlin, Beck continued Piłsudski‘s 
policy of seeking closer relations with London. At the League of Nations 
meeting in Geneva on January 26, 1938, when told by British Foreign 
Secretary Antony Eden that, except for France, Belgium and Holland, 
Britain could only act through the League, Beck repeated to him what he had 
said to Chamberlain in London in 1937: that Poland was the only country on 
the Continent which could extend aid on land to these countries [by 
attacking Germany if it attacked France]. He also said that Poland had 
confirmed her commitments to France as an ally, that future European 
arrangements must allow France and Poland full freedom to carry out their 
alliance obligations, and inquired about possible Polish purchases of heavy 
anti-aircraft artillery from Britain. In view of his knowledge of Halifax‘s 
statement to Hitler and what he had heard from Eden, it is not surprising 
that, on February 28, Beck told Göring that Poland was interested in a region 
of Czechoslovakia, Moravská-Ostrava, which included Zaolzie.
41
   
 Nevertheless, as H. L. Roberts wrote, Beck and key Polish decision-
makers did not plan to help Hitler dismember Czechoslovakia.
42 
It is also 
clear that, assuming Czechoslovakia would collapse without Western 
support (as Czechoslovak leaders had assumed earlier about Poland), the 
Polish government did not want Germany to absorb or otherwise dominate 
the whole country. Many Polish diplomatic documents were destroyed or 
lost in September 1939, but among the survivors is one that outlines Beck‘s 
policy aims, at least as they existed in the spring of 1938. In a letter of April 
12, 1938, the Polish Under-Secretary of State, Jan Szembek, wrote that the 
worst solution for Poland would be German domination of all of 
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Czechoslovakia. Therefore, German annexation of the Sudetenland was 
acceptable to Warsaw, provided it was accompanied by the separation of 
Slovakia from the Czech lands and its union with Hungary, the return [to 
Poland] of Silesia [Zaolzie], and the establishment of a Polish-Hungarian 
frontier.
43
 At the same time, however, Polish decision-makers believed, as 
did the army and the majority of Polish public opinion, that Poland could not 
be on Germany‘s side in a European war. In late May, as Hitler was stoking 
the Czechoslovak crisis (which burst out in full force after the Czechoslovak 
Army mobilized in May on faulty intelligence of an impending German 
attack), Beck rejected French Foreign Minister George Bonnet‘s request that 
Poland support a British (but not French) warning to Berlin not to sharpen 
the German-Czechoslovak dispute, which might lead to war. At the same 
time, however, while re-stating the Polish demand for equal treatment of the 
Polish minority with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, Beck reaffirmed 
Poland‘s readiness to fulfill her treaty obligations to France and proposed a 
discussion ―of new phenomena‖ with Bonnet. This proposal was, however, 
rejected by the French Foreign Minister, a staunch appeaser who favored 
loosening French ties with Poland.
44
  
 Beck summed up his view of the situation at two special 
conferences, probably in late May or sometime in June 1938. In his later 
report on ―The Political Preliminaries to 1939,‖ Beck wrote that at these 
conferences he stated his view that the Czechs would not fight; the Western 
countries were not morally or materially prepared to intervene to the Czechs‘ 
advantage; and that Russia [sic] was conducting an action rather in the 
nature of a demonstration. It seemed, he said, that she was more interested in 
poisoning Czech-German relations than helping the Czechs. In any case, 
careful observation of Soviet territory did not show any military preparations 
to intervene, while the ―purge‖ of the Red Army officer corps left the army 
in very bad shape. Finally, Beck wrote, he always added that Poland should 
not be the first to undertake any action against the Czechs. He also said that 
if his hypothesis should prove mistaken, Polish policy must change within 
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twenty-four hours because, in case of a real European war with Germany, 
Poland could not be, even indirectly, on Germany‘s side.
45
  
 Indeed, at around this time Beck tried to sound out the French and 
British attitudes toward German expansion in Eastern Europe through the 
U.S. ambassador to Poland, Biddle. In mid-June, in the same conversation in 
which Beck told Biddle that Poland would not agree to German transit to 
Soviet Ukraine, he also told the ambassador that the armies of Poland, 
Romania, and perhaps Yugoslavia, could offer effective resistance to 
Germany — but only in conjunction with the Western Powers. As he put it, 
if France and Britain engaged German armies in the West, ―Poland would 
march not for Czechoslovakia but against Germany.‖ Biddle also reported 
Polish hopes that, after the current crisis was resolved, France and Britain 
would support an East European bloc to check German expansion.
46
 There 
was, however, no Western response to these suggestions, nor could there be 
since both France and Britain wanted to avoid war with Germany.  
 It would take too much time and space to list all the developments 
in the period from May to late September 1938.
47
 Suffice it to say that Beck 
made Polish claims to Zaolzie clear to the Czechoslovak government as well 
as to the British, French, German and Italian governments, especially when 
the crisis heated up in the second half of September. He also warned Hitler 
that Poland would stand by its demand for a key railway junction in the 
northern part of Zaolzie, where the German minority demanded union with 
Germany. In fact, as the Poles learned from the French on September 27, on 
a German map given to Chamberlain when he met with Hitler at Godesberg 
on September 22-23, Bohumin was marked for immediate German 
annexation while a large part of Zaolzie was marked for a plebiscite. Beck 
immediately instructed Ambassador Józef Lipski to present Polish claims to 
Hitler.
48
 Meanwhile, on September 22-23, the Sudeten German Party also 
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claimed the region. News of the SGP claim, as well as the expectation of 
Western acceptance of German claims, were connected both with the 
stationing of Polish troops on the border with Czechoslovakia and the Polish 
government‘s attempt to stage a local Polish uprising in Zaolzie, which 
fizzled out. It should be noted that on the first day of the Godesberg meeting, 
Hitler demanded the withdrawal of Czech troops and the entry of German 
troops by September 28, but extended the date the next day to October 1 and 
sent his demands to Prague. Chamberlain was willing to accept them, but the 
British government decided to take a stand and put the navy on alert, while 
the French army called up the reservists. There was an international crisis 
and the Czechs, who had accepted the cession of the predominantly German 
part of the Sudetenland under Western pressure a few days earlier, were now 
told they could mobilize. France and Britain, however, only wanted to save 
face and sought a peaceful resolution of German claims, so they gratefully 
accepted Mussolini‘s proposal of a conference. Thus, on September 29, at 
Munich, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain, the French Prime Minister 
Eduard Daladier, and the Italian head of state, Benito Mussolini, agreed to 
Hitler‘s demand for the cession of the predominantly German part of the 
Sudetenland to Germany. The German Army was to come into the area 
beginning on October 1. An ―International Commission‖ — composed of the 
German Foreign Secretary, the British and French ambassadors in Berlin and 
a representative to be named by the Czechoslovak government, which had 
not been consulted on these terms  — was to oversee the occupation as well 
as the plebiscites to be held in ethnically mixed areas. Britain and France 
agreed to participate in an international guarantee of the new Czechoslovak 
frontiers against unprovoked aggression, while Germany and Italy undertook 
to guarantee it after the Hungarian and Polish claims had been settled. The 
Czechoslovak government was simply informed of the Great Powers‘ 
agreement. (In fact, there were no plebiscites and no international guarantee 
of the remaining Czechoslovak state.)  
 With the announcement of the Munich Conference decisions on the 
morning of September 30, 1938, it was clear that German troops would enter 
the Sudetenland beginning on October 1, while Poland (which claimed 
Zaolzie) and Hungary (which claimed southern Slovakia and Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia) were to wait three months for the examination of their claims 
unless separate agreements were reached in the meanwhile. Everything now 
depended on the decision of President Beneš: would he reject the Munich 
verdict and fight — in which case France was bound to come into the war as 
an ally of Czechoslovakia, and so would Poland as an ally of France — or 
would he accept it? Beck discussed with the chief of the Polish General 
Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, possible military aid to Czechoslovakia 
if the latter fought, but Beneš accepted the Munich verdict at noon on 
September 30. Three days earlier, the Polish government had made its 
second explicit proposal tending to the same end: a plebiscite in the part of 
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Zaolzie inhabited by a strong proportion of Poles — the areas were marked 
on a map — followed by its immediate cession to Poland and a plebiscite on 
disputed territories. This was to be the basis of a bilateral agreement on 
Polish-Czechoslovak relations. The Polish envoy in Prague, Kazimierz 
Papée, was empowered to begin preliminary negotiations, but there was no 
answer until September 30. The Czechoslovak answer, handed to the Polish 
envoy in Prague an hour after Beneš accepted the Munich decisions, was 
received in Warsaw sometime in the afternoon of that day. It was judged 
inadequate because, while accepting the need to rectify the frontier, it 
rejected plebiscites and the immediate transfer of some territory. Instead, it 
proposed the establishment of a Polish-Czechoslovak commission that 
would begin its work on October 5, completing it between October 31 and 
December 1.
49
  
  That same afternoon, Beck spoke at a special conference held at the 
Royal Castle and proposed drastic Polish action. According to the notes of 
Deputy Premier Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, Beck said that what happened at 
Munich was reminiscent of the Four Power Pact projected four years earlier. 
[This is a reference to the agreement by Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
to revise disputed frontiers, signed in July 1934 but not implemented.] Beck 
said he believed that one must quickly, and as drastically as possible, oppose 
such methods of settling territorial disputes. Only determined action could 
save Poland from another Munich. Speaking of Zaolzie, he warned that 
immediate action was necessary because ―if we hesitate and delay, Germany 
may seize this valuable and highly industrialized patch of land, eliminating 
Polish claims to Zaolzie for a long time to come.‖ He then mentioned that 
the Polish government had demanded, and received, the Czechoslovak 
government‘s agreement in principle to equal treatment with the German 
minority. Since Prague was to cede territories inhabited by Germans to 
Germany, Poland must demand the same for her claim, and he proposed 
sending an ultimatum to Prague. Kwiatkowski wrote that he was the only 
person to disagree, suggesting a diplomatic procedure instead, but was 
overruled. As for Beck himself, he wrote later that in view of the expansion 
of German territory very near to the Polish frontier and especially to Zaolzie, 
which was so valuable for Poland, also in view of the violation by the four 
Powers of the sovereign rights of nations and the integrity of national 
territory, he was convinced that Poland must immediately react to both these 
developments. Therefore, he stated that in view of the above circumstances, 
General [Władysław] Bortnowski ―must march into Zaolzie and against 
Munich.‖ That evening, Beck told Szembek that the British ambassador told 
him the Czechs had informed London they had agreed to the Polish demands 
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and would cede the counties of Cieszyn and Frysztat to Poland, while the 
French ambassador said his government had told the Czechs they should 
send a reply more in line with Polish demands.
50
  
 Consequent to the decision, an ultimatum was sent to Prague in a 
coded radio message, also carried by a pilot dispatched in a special plane, 
demanding the Czech evacuation and transfer of two western counties of 
Zaolzie [Cieszyn and Frysztat] within twenty-four hours, while other issues 
raised by the Polish note of September 27, including plebiscites in other 
areas, would be left to a later understanding between the two governments. 
The ultimatum had a time limit of noon, October 1. The French and British 
ambassadors in Warsaw pleaded for Polish acceptance of the Czechoslovak 
offer to negotiate; Chamberlain offered his mediation, President Franklin 
Roosevelt appealed for a peaceful settlement of Polish claims, and the 
French government was already pressing the Czechoslovak government to 
accept Polish demands. By the evening of September 30 it was, however, too 
late to stop the Polish action. The ultimatum was sent; it was presented in 
Prague a little after midnight and accepted the next day, October 1, at 11.30 
a.m. with a request for a one-hour extension for the formal acceptance (that 
is, 1 p.m. on October 1), which was granted.
51
 Polish troops moved into the 
counties of Cieszyn and Frysztat the next day, and the annexation of Zaolzie 
was supported by all political parties as well as the vast majority of Poles. 
Western public opinion condemned the Polish action, although the British 
and French governments had advised the Czechs to accept the Polish 
demands. Now, however, their media, along with Soviet media, had a field 
day. Beck‘s name has been blackened by this action ever since, 
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overshadowing the Western Powers‘ betrayal of Czechoslovakia, 
particularly by its ally, France. This condemnation also came to overshadow 
Beck‘s success in turning the British guarantee of Polish independence 
(March 31, 1939) into a provisional mutual aid agreement (April 6, 1939) 
and then alliance between the two countries (August 26, 1939).  
 What did Poland gain with Zaolzie? In economic terms, in the 
period October 1938-September 1939 the region produced 52.2% of Polish 
coking coal, 67% of its pig iron and 38% of its steel. Production in all three 
categories was more than Poland needed but, given time, it would have 
allowed a major increase in her armaments instead of strengthening Hitler, 
while in the short term she could, of course, export the surplus. The Polish-
Czechoslovak negotiations led to the cession of a few areas in Orava as well 
as Spis and Čadca in the Tatra mountains, deemed important for military 
reasons (mountain passes). Although most of the land gained was Polish, it 
included some Slovak villages, which led to great Slovak resentment. All in 
all, Poland gained a significant increase of its industrial production, 869,000 
km. of land and 258,000 mostly Polish-speaking people.
52
  
The Polish use of the ultimatum in demanding Zaolzie from 
Czechoslovakia is known; what is less known is, as mentioned earlier, that 
Beck also tried to achieve three other goals on 1938. The first was the 
creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, 
which failed then due to regional rivalries (see below), to be annexed six 
months later in mid-March 1939. The second was the inclusion of an 
autonomous Slovakia within Hungary. As it turned out, Hitler established an 
―independent‖ Slovakia at the same time as he seized the Czech lands in 
mid-March 1939, but minus the predominantly Hungarian-speaking areas 
granted earlier to Hungary. Beck‘s third and most important goal was 
Hitler‘s formal recognition of the status of the Free City of Danzig and of 
the Polish-German frontier. When, however, Ambassador Lipski presented 
all these proposals to the Führer on September 20, Chamberlain had already 
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signified his agreement in principle to Hitler‘s demands for the cession of 
the preponderantly German-speaking Sudetenland on the basis of self-
determination; the British and French leaders had agreed to this and 
mandated the cession to Czechoslovakia. Thus Poland had no leverage in 
Berlin. Indeed, Lipski‘s proposals, made on Beck‘s express instructions, 
elicited Hitler‘s reply that Danzig was covered by the Polish-German 
declaration of 1934 — but also the suggestion of a 30 meter-wide German 
Corridor through the Polish Corridor to accommodate a superhighway 
connected with railways.
53
 This was the opening shot in German diplomatic 
pressure on Poland to agree to the return of the Free City to Germany, with 
guaranteed Polish rights, and to an extra-territorial German Corridor through 
the Polish Corridor. Later German proposals included compensation for 
Poland in Soviet Ukraine. The Polish government played for time and finally 
rejected the German demands on March 25, 1939, five days before being 
offered, and accepting, the British guarantee of Poland‘s independence.
54
  
 As mentioned earlier, Beck‘s major regional goal during the 
Czechoslovak crisis of 1938 was to secure a common frontier with Hungary 
in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This was to be the keystone of his projected 
Polish-Hungarian-Romanian (and possibly also Yugoslav) bloc, which he 
had briefly mentioned to American Ambassador William Bullitt in June 
1938. The goal of ―The Third Europe‖ was to stem further German 
expansion in Eastern Europe. Beck worked for this together with the 
Hungarians and tried to secure Romanian support. He discussed it with King 
Carol II of Romania in mid-October 1938, but the project failed to get off 
the ground. This was partly due to Romanian reluctance to give up receiving 
military supplies from Czechoslovakia, and partly to the clash of Hungarian 
and Romanian claims– not to speak of the Hungarian revisionist demand 
regarding Transylvania — but most of all due to the lack of any Western 
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support for this endeavor. Mussolini, who wanted to expand Italian influence 
in the Balkans, had been inclined to support the project but backed out.
55
  
 Thus, all that Poland gained from the Czechoslovak crisis was 
Zaolzie. Could Beck have satisfied Polish territorial claims on 
Czechoslovakia — claims that had the support of the majority of Poles at the 
time — in some way other than by the threat of force? On the one hand, the 
Czechoslovak government‘s agreement of September 30 to the rectification 
of the frontier along with an offer of negotiations seemed to offer Poland an 
acceptable way of obtaining the territory both without Western mediation 
and without incurring the black public image that has stuck to Beck ever 
since. On the other hand, the procedure proposed by the Czechs would take 
some time, which Hitler could use to pressure the Polish government into 
accepting German demands regarding Danzig and the Corridor. These were, 
in fact, formulated officially to Lipski as ―suggestions‖ by Ribbbentrop in 
late October 1938. In exchange, Ribbentrop offered the possible extension of 
the Polish-German agreement (1934) for twenty-five years. He also 
proposed that Poland join the Anti-Comintern Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) 
and suggested a joint German-Polish policy toward the USSR. Lipski 
warned Ribbentrop that he did not see the possibility of a Polish-German 
understanding on the basis of reuniting Danzig with Germany. He did not 
speak about the Corridor issue, and the Polish government never took up the 
Anti-Comintern proposal. It should be noted that at this time there was more 
talk by Danzig Nazis about the city‘s return to the motherland and therefore 
more friction with Poland.
56
 Hitler might well have found a pretext to move 
German troops into Zaolzie — perhaps in answer to an appeal by the local 
German minority, supported by the Sudeten German Party — and then offer 
it to Poland. In his conference speech of September 30, Beck had mentioned 
not only the danger of German expansion very near the Polish frontier, 
especially Zaolzie, but also that only drastic Polish action could prevent 
another Munich. He presumably had in mind a meeting of the same Western 
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heads of state in three months‘ time to examine — and settle — Polish and 
Hungarian claims if no agreements had been reached in the meantime. They 
might even consider settling Hitler‘s demands on the Danzig-Corridor issue 
— in his favor. 
 Ultimately, even though Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations on the 
transfer of remaining territory were concluded and agreements were signed 
on November 30, 1938, the form of presenting its demands to Prague two 
months earlier, that is, the ultimatum, gave Poland a very bad public image 
both at the time and in the history books. Beck has been charged recently by 
a Polish historian with ruining Poland‘s reputation, or at least strengthening 
its image as a de facto ally of Germany, isolating it from its French ally and 
other Western states.
57 
One may note, however, that Poland‘s reputation was 
already bad, due to accusations regarding the Polish-German Declaration of 
Non-Aggression as well as the formally good relations between the two 
countries since that time, which were suspect to and greatly resented by 
France. As noted earlier, the declaration was interpreted as a secret alliance 
by most communist sympathizers and socialists in Western Europe, not to 
mention the USSR. Beck also knew that if Hitler publicized German 
demands regarding Danzig and the Polish Corridor, they would meet with 
general Western support, particularly in Britain. Finally, one may assume 
that, since Western governments and public opinion welcomed the Munich 
Conference decisions on Czechoslovakia as saving the peace, they would 
very likely have accepted peaceful Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations for the 
transfer of Zaolzie. Therefore, it was not the official principle of Poland‘s 
demand for equal treatment of the Polish and German minorities of 
Czechoslovakia on the basis of self-determination, but rather the method 
chosen to secure the territory that proved unacceptable to Western 
governments and public opinion. In hindsight, it seems that Beck should 
have accepted the Czechoslovak offer of September 30, even at the risk of a 
sudden German takeover. It would be unrealistic, however, to expect such a 
decision from the contemporary Polish decision-makers, led by Beck, so the 
ultimatum can be judged as regrettable, but it must be viewed in the context 
of the Munich agreement as well as Polish interests, public opinion, and the 
dramatic conditions of the time. 
  The Polish ultimatum to Prague certainly led to frosty Polish 
relations with France and Britain. Relations with France soon recovered, 
however, and Beck worked successfully to improve relations with Britain. 
At the end of November, he instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, 
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Edward Raczyński, to see British Foreign Secretary Halifax and explain 
Polish foreign policy aims to him. With regard to Czechoslovakia, the 
ambassador was to say that Poland had been ready to settle her demands 
regarding that country together with the Western Powers [that is, at Munich]. 
Since that proved unfeasible, she did so independently ―without any debts of 
gratitude to anyone, including Germany.‖ (The ambassador carried out 
Beck‘s instruction on December 15).
 58
 The Beck initiative began a period of 
improved relations which accompanied Hitler‘s destruction of the 
Czechoslovak State in mid-March 1939, leading to the British guarantee of 
Polish independence at the end of that month, to a provisional mutual aid 
agreement a few days later, and finally to a treaty of alliance in late August 
1939. 
 Soviet-Polish relations also improved after a short period of tension 
caused by the Soviet threat of September 23, 1938, to abrogate the Polish-
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact if Polish troops moved into Czechoslovakia.
 
Beck answered the same day that the Polish government was not obliged to 
explain its policy to anyone.
59 
This was in keeping with his belief that Soviet 
policy had the character of a demonstration rather than action, that is, for 
show. It should be noted, however, that on September 27 visible Soviet 
military preparations were reported by Polish diplomats in the Minsk region, 
and there was a Polish protest against Soviet planes over-flying the 
frontier.
60 
It was no coincidence that the Czechoslovak reply, dated 
September 22, to the Polish demand of September 21 for an immediate 
decision on Polish inhabited territories analogous to the Czechoslovak 
decision on the German problem — i.e., the cession of Zaolzie — arrived in 
Warsaw on September 26, just before Soviet military activity on the Polish-
Soviet frontier was observed. In fact, Beneš had asked for Soviet pressure on 
Poland.
61
 Soviet as well as some Western historians have claimed that the 
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Soviet Union stood ready to help the Czechs if only the Red Army could 
transit through either Poland or Romania,
62
 although it seems more likely 
that the Red Army might have moved into Poland. There is, however, no 
documented Soviet request to the Polish Government to agree to the Red 
Army‘s transit through Poland to Czechoslovakia, nor is there a documented 
plan of Soviet military operations. Also, it seems rather unlikely that Stalin 
would have tangled with Hitler even if France and Britain had done so — 
and from reading their diplomatic correspondence he knew that they did not 
want to fight Germany but sought a peaceful satisfaction of Hitler‘s 
demand.
63
 If the Western Powers had given strong indications of readiness 
to fight Germany, it seems possible that Stalin could have sent the Red 
Army into southeastern Poland. In fact, according to the memoirs of General 
Maurice Gamelin, then head of the French General Staff, on September 26 
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— that is, during the crisis — the Soviet military attaché in Paris spoke of 
thirty divisions and cavalry units on the frontier with Poland, as well as 
tanks and most of the Soviet air force.
64
 As mentioned earlier, no military 
plan for such action has surfaced so far, but the pro-Soviet Czechoslovak 
envoy in Moscow, Zdenek Fierlinger, reported the expectation that in case of 
―a favorable development,‖ the USSR would try to establish a common 
border with Czechoslovakia.
65
 This would, of course, have meant Soviet 
annexation of at least part of southeastern Poland (former East Galicia). 
Indeed,
 
as Richard Raack has shown, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs Vladimir P. Potemkin wrote, under an assumed name, about a new 
partition of Poland in Pravda before the Munich Conference in 1938; he also 
told a French diplomat in October 1938 that it was inevitable. Stalin, of 
course, shared Lenin‘s view that there would be a second ―imperialist‖ war, 
and saw it as the prime occasion for Soviet action and expansion. As he said 
at a party conference in 1925, if such a war broke out, the USSR would 
come in to add the decisive weight to the scales — the weight that would tip 
them.
66
 In Potemkin‘s article and his later statement, Stalin might have been 
advertising his terms for aligning either with Hitler or the Western Powers in 
the expected ―imperialist‖ war. Ultimately, he chose Hitler. 
  Some historians and other authors writing on the history of the 
immediate prewar period claim even today that Hitler‘s demands were 
reasonable and should have been accepted by the Poles, thus preventing the 
outbreak of the World War II. This claim ignores the fact that Hitler was not 
a reasonable and responsible statesman and that his aim was to build a great 
German empire. In mid-March 1939, he broke his word, given at Munich, 
that he would not seek territory with non-German populations, by annexing 
the Czech lands and destroying the Czechoslovak state. It is also known that, 
on hearing of the Polish rejection of his demands for Danzig and a German 
Corridor through the Polish Corridor, the Führer issued a directive on March 
25 to the head of the German General Staff. He wrote that, not wishing to 
drive the Poles into the arms of Great Britain, he did not want to resolve the 
Danzig issue by force. He would consider a military occupation of the city 
only if the Polish government indicated it could not justify a voluntary 
surrender to its people and would therefore welcome a [German] ―fait 
accompli.‖ After citing the above statement, the British historian A. J. P. 
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Taylor concluded that ―Hitler‘s objective was alliance with Poland, not her 
destruction.‖
67
 He did so by omitting the next paragraph where the Führer 
wrote that a resolution of the problem in the near future required favorable 
political conditions. Poland would then be so beaten down that she would 
not count as a political factor for decades. Hitler envisaged extending the 
German frontier from the eastern coast of East Prussia to the eastern tip of 
[Upper] Silesia, but noted that out-settling [Poles] and resettling [Germans] 
were still open questions.
68
 Indeed, although Hitler repeated his allegedly 
reasonable demands in his speech to the Reichstag of April 28, 1939, his 
primary goal was always to gain Lebensraum for the German people, which 
he envisaged in Poland and the USSR. As he told Göring and high German 
army officers on May 23, 1939, Danzig was not the objective — it was to 
gain Lebensraum in the East, and settle the land with Germans to secure 
nourishment for the German people.
69
  
  Despite the fact that the above documents have been available in 
print for over fifty years, some Anglo-American and Russian historians still 
express the view that Hitler‘s demands should have been accepted and that, 
by rejecting them, Poland bears responsibility for outbreak of World War II. 
Taylor also called the Poles ―political gamblers‖ and opined that sober 
statesmen would have surrendered, seeing the dangers confronting them and 
their country‘s inadequate means to deal with them.
70
 This view was then 
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extrapolated into a Polish tendency to commit national suicide. One 
American historian even cites Balzac‘s statement ―You only have to show a 
Pole a precipice and he will throw himself over it.‖
71
 Niall Ferguson also 
writes in this vein, stating that in 1939 the Poles ―were suicidally determined 
to fight.‖
 72
 
 Poles were not suicidal in 1939 — after all, at that time they had 
alliances with Britain and France — but Poland‘s terrible fate inspired even 
some Polish historians to argue that Poland should have joined Hitler in 
attacking the USSR, thus avoiding the enormous losses she suffered in 
World War II. One of them even imagined Beck and Hitler presiding over a 
victory parade in Red Square.
73
 Beck, however, understood what Hitler had 
in mind for Poland if she bowed to his demands. The Polish foreign 
minister‘s comment on the idea of a Polish-German war against the USSR 
— recorded when he was interned in Romania — reads: ―We would have 
defeated Russia, and afterwards we would be taking Hitler‘s cows out to 
pasture in the Urals.‖
74 
Although Beck did not know it, Nazi plans 
envisaged, after victory over the USSR, deporting much of the Polish 
population to Siberia and settling the land with Germans. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Beck managed to turn the British guarantee of 
Polish independence of March 31, 1939, into a provisional agreement on 
mutual aid, signed on April 6, which became a treaty of mutual aid — that 
is, an alliance — on August 25, 1939. Diplomatic historians of this period 
know that the British and French governments sought not to help or 
safeguard Poland as such, but rather to prevent or at least delay German 
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aggression against Poland, which would mean war. Beck, for his part, 
believed that Poland‘s alliances would prevent a German attack, giving him 
the chance to reach an agreement both satisfactory to Hitler and protecting 
vital Polish interests. Both London and Paris, however, hoped for another 
international conference — though this time with the loser, Poland, present 
— to transfer Danzig and the Polish Corridor to Germany, and they made no 
plans to attack Germany as they committed to do if she attacked their ally. 
The Polish government, especially Beck, cannot be blamed for believing that 
Poland‘s allies would carry out their commitments. It was, after all, 
reasonable to expect them to attack Germany when she was fighting Poland, 
rather than wait for Hitler to attack them with full force in their turn, which 
is what actually happened. Nor can Beck and the Polish government be 
blamed for preventing a Franco-British-Soviet alliance in 1939.
75
 Stalin was 
clearly unwilling to go to war with Nazi Germany not only in 1938 and 1939 
but also in 1941. He knew the Red Army was not ready to fight the German 
Wehrmacht, so he refused to believe warnings of Hitler‘s plan to attack the 
USSR and reports of German troop concentrations on the Soviet western 
borders right up to June 22, 1941.  
In conclusion, what kind of verdict does Józef Beck deserve? 
Taylor‘s judgment that ―Beck, the foreign minister, always possessed 
complete self-confidence, though not much else‖ indicates his ignorance of 
Polish foreign policy. Furthermore, in his book he called the appeasement of 
Germany at Munich ―the triumph of all that was best and most enlightened 
in British life.‖ Few historians today know that Taylor, who had opposed 
Munich in 1938, wrote this when he viewed war as the greatest of all evils 
and was actively supporting the movement for unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament.
76 
Beck must have been anathema to Taylor for rejecting 
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Hitler‘s proposals, then resisting German aggression, and thus setting off 
World War II. 
 In view of the knowledge available to historians today, Beck can be 
seen as a remarkable Polish statesman who did the best that could be done to 
steer Poland between the Scylla of Nazi Germany and the Charybdis of the 
USSR. He is charged with being misled too long by the belief that Hitler 
intended to maintain good relations with Poland.
77 
This is, at best, a 
misinterpretation. Like most statesmen of the time, Beck did not believe that 
Hitler would risk another war with the Western Powers, which is not the 
same thing as trusting in Hitler‘s good intentions toward Poland. Moreover, 
in 1936-38 he tried to interest the British in Polish military help for France, 
Belgium and Holland in case of war, and hinted in June 1938 at the 
possibility of a Polish-Hungarian-Romanian bloc which could fight 
Germany in the East if Britain and France fought her in the West. He did not 
oppose a compromise solution to the Danzig problem as long as it did not 
threaten vital Polish interests, but what Hitler wanted was the end of Polish 
independence.
77
 Beck does not deserve the charge of cooperating with 
Hitler, either in 1934 or in 1938.
78
 The Polish-German Non-Aggression 
Declaration did not contain any secret, anti-Soviet protocols, nor did it ruin 
or undermine the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, since France 
had been trying to neuter or even get rid of her alliance with Poland at least 
since the Locarno Treaties of 1925. In 1938, expecting the demise of 
Czechoslovakia, Beck was a realist in preparing to gain Zaolzie for Poland 
— acting parallel to but not with, or for Hitler — and in trying to obtain 
German agreement to a common Polish-Hungarian frontier as the keystone 
for a future anti-German bloc, while also seeking a formal German 
recognition of the status of Danzig as a Free City and of the Polish-German 
frontier. Finally, he always believed that Poland could never side with Berlin 
in a European war. 
  In a rare, positive evaluation of Beck‘s policy, written almost fifty 
years after opposing his proposal of sending an ultimatum to 
Czechoslovakia, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski wrote that the whole, layered 
historical past and even tactical arguments favored Beck‘s policy toward 
Czechoslovakia in 1938. He noted that Wincenty Witos, head of the Polish 
                                                                                                  
he had written the book to provoke a reaction, he angrily replied: ―I meant every 
word I said.‖ 
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Peasant Party, then in Czechoslovak exile, condemned Prague‘s policy 
regarding Zaolzie, while Maciej Rataj, former speaker of the Sejm, told the 
Czech journalist Vacláv Fiala he could not follow any other policy than 
Beck. Kwiatkowski concluded with a judgment of Beck‘s foreign policy, 
especially in 1939: 
 
Finally, in the name of objectivity, one has to say that it is easy to 
criticize Beck‘s actions because, like every active individual he 
made many errors and mistakes. But it is very difficult even today, 
after the great drama of war, to find another, fundamentally 
different alternative to Polish policy at that time. Two such different 
concepts were then hiding in dark, political corners of Poland. One 
proclaimed the desire for a complete capitulation to the Soviets with 
the alleged goal of defending Poland against the expected Nazi 
aggression. The other suggested fraternization with Hitler against 
the expansion of greedy Stalinist communism. Beck decisively and 
categorically rejected these two depraved political options. He 
chose a rocky, difficult road full of visible and hidden dangers, but a 
simple and Polish road.
79
  
 
  Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Polish Foreign Minister in 2005, 
has also praised Beck. He reminded his fellow Poles on May 5, 2009, of 
Beck‘s speech delivered in the Polish parliament exactly seventy years 
earlier. On that day, Beck gave the Polish reply to Hitler‘s speech of April 
28, in which the Führer had abrogated both the German-British naval 
agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression 
of 1934, while repeating his demands for the return of Danzig and a German 
Corridor through the Polish Corridor. Beck ended his speech with the 
statement: 
 
Peace is a valuable and desirable thing. Our generation, which has 
shed its blood in several wars, surely deserves a period of peace. But 
peace, like almost everything in this world, has its price, high but 
definable. We in Poland do not recognize the concept of ―peace at 
any price.‖ There is only one thing in the life of men, nations and 
states which is without price, and that is honor.
80
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Rotfeld commented that Beck‘s great merit was not to give in to Hitler‘s 
blackmail. His statement in the Polish parliament was welcomed by Poles; it 
showed courage and reasonable political thinking. The Polish Foreign 
Minister could not prevent Nazi aggression, but he was responsible for the 
fact that the German invasion of Poland met with armed resistance.
81
  
 Historians might well consider the most likely results of the 
alternative history consequent on the acceptance of Hitler‘s demands by 
Beck in 1939. Germany was not ready to invade the USSR in the fall of 
1939, even with a satellite Poland in tow, but she could have attacked France 
as Hitler had planned to do after defeating Poland. His generals, however, 
persuaded him to wait due to severe losses by the Luftwaffe, which also 
used up its entire bomb stock in Poland. He would have defeated France 
even faster than in 1940 and then demanded — as Hitler did in summer 1940 
— that Britain accept German domination over Europe. In the fall of 1939, 
Britain would have been much weaker than it was a year later, and who 
knows if Churchill would have been as successful then in getting the 
government to reject Hitler‘s proposals as he was in May 1940?
82
 As it 
turned out, Poland‘s lonely fight against Nazi Germany gained precious time 
for her allies. It was wasted by France, whose military leaders rejected the 
idea of a repeat, successful German Blitzkrieg in the West, particularly in 
France. But it was used to the full by Britain, which produced about 600 
fighter planes per month between fall 1939 and fall 1940. Some of these 
planes were flown by the Polish pilots who made up ten percent of RAF 
pilots active in the Battle of Britain in mid-September 1940.
83
  
Beck died of tuberculosis in a dilapidated village schoolhouse in 
Romania on June 5, 1944, on the eve of the successful Allied landing in 
northwestern France. He was buried in a Bucharest cemetery, but his 
remains were repatriated and interred with honors in the Powązki Military 
Cemetery in Warsaw on May 24, 1991. He deserves a fair reassessment for 
continuing Piłsudski‘s policy of equilibrium between Nazi Germany and the 
USSR, working to secure important gains for Poland in the Czechoslovak 
crisis of 1938, and finally as the statesman who refused even to consider 
Poland as a vassal state, let alone an ally of Germany.  
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